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AMAZON AND PLATFORM ANTITRUST 
Ben Bloodstein* 
 
With its decision in Ohio v. American Express, the U.S. Supreme Court for 
the first time embraced the recently developed, yet increasingly prolific, 
concept of the two-sided platform.  Through advances in technology, 
platforms, which serve as intermediaries allowing two groups to transact, 
are increasingly ubiquitous, and many of the biggest tech companies operate 
in this fashion.  Amazon Marketplace, for example, provides a platform for 
third-party vendors to sell directly to consumers through Amazon’s web and 
mobile interfaces. 
At the same time that platforms and their scholarship have evolved, a 
burgeoning antitrust movement has also developed which focuses on the 
impact of the dominance of these tech companies and the fear that current 
antitrust laws are ill-equipped to prevent any potential anticompetitive 
behavior.  Many of those who feel this way worried that American Express, 
which decided whether a plaintiff alleging anticompetitive behavior by a two-
sided platform would have to show harm to both sides of the market to make 
a prima facie case, would give companies like Amazon even more power. 
This Note argues that while the case could be interpreted in such a way, 
because Amazon and similarly situated platforms possess a great degree of 
control over their users—in some cases competing with them directly—it 
would be unwise to do so. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many modern internet-based companies relied upon by consumers and 
businesses alike operate, at least in some capacity, as two-sided platforms.1  
The concept originates from relatively new economic developments2 but was 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2018.  Although there is no 
unanimously agreed upon definition of what makes these firms two-sided,3 
for the sake of simplicity, this Note designates a two-sided platform as one 
that facilitates interactions between two groups that derive value or revenue 
from one another.4  For instance, both American Express and Amazon’s 
third-party marketplace (“Amazon Marketplace”) are two-sided platforms 
because they connect merchants to consumers,5 and Google is a two-sided 
platform because it connects users to advertisers.6  Catering to multiple sides 
makes two-sided platforms different from one-sided platforms in that any 
change in price the platform makes to either side will affect sales on both 
sides.7  Thus, the two-sided firm must delicately balance the needs of both 
sides.8 
Antitrust law, aimed at promoting fair competition for the purpose of 
consumer benefit,9 typically requires any litigant challenging a firm’s alleged 
anticompetitive practices to show proof of harm to the relevant market in 
which the firm operates.10  Thus, it becomes important to define said 
market.11  Prior to Ohio v. American Express12 (“AmEx”), two-sided 
platforms had been analyzed in the same manner as one-sided platforms:  
without mention of sides.13  However, in AmEx, for the first time, the Court 
relied on relatively new, yet highly topical, economics research to hold that 
 
 1. See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 784 (2017) 
(discussing Amazon).  See generally Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online Search and 
Social Networking:  A Matter of Two-Sided Markets, 36 WORLD COMPETITION 195 (2013) 
(discussing primarily Google and Facebook). 
 2. See generally Andrea Amelio et al., Exclusionary Practices and Two-Sided Platforms, 
in OECD, RETHINKING ANTITRUST TOOLS FOR MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 131 (2018). 
 3. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, What’s So Special About Two-Sided 
Markets?, in TOWARDS A JUST SOCIETY:  JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND 21ST CENTURY ECONOMICS 111, 
112 (Martin Guzman ed., 2018). 
 4. See David S. Evans, Essential Principles for the Design of Antitrust Analysis for 
Multisided Platforms 5 (Oct. 6, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3261812 [https://perma.cc/G6TW-3TD2]. 
 5. See id. at 3 n.2. 
 6. See Thépot, supra note 1, at 196. 
 7. David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate 
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 680–81. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See 1 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 100 (4th ed. 2016). 
 10. 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1500 (3d ed. 2006). 
 11. Id. 
 12. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
 13. See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 1), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219396 [https://perma.cc/ 
WW4P-ST48]. 
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because the relevant market was for credit card transactions themselves, as 
opposed to the market for merchant credit card fees or consumer card 
benefits, the merchant-plaintiff must consider the effects to both sides of the 
two-sided platform when alleging that a restraint is anticompetitive.14 
This decision arrives at a time when some of these platforms—Facebook, 
Google, Amazon, and others—continue to grow at rapid paces while 
expanding into new industries and collecting massive amounts of user data.15  
Using this data, these firms are able to exercise their market power to create 
restraints of trade, like acquiring entrants before they become competitive 
threats or selectively excluding participants from search engine results.16  
One example this Note will discuss at length is Amazon Marketplace’s 
practice of using its third-party sellers’ sales data to decide whether to enter 
their markets and subsequently compete with them.17  As a result of exercises 
of power like these, scholars,18 American politicians on both sides of the 
aisle,19 and foreign governments20 have become focused on the potential 
short- and long-term consequences of structural dominance by companies 
like Amazon.  These scholars see antitrust as a potential check on these 
companies but argue that it is currently ill-equipped.21  Most notably, in her 
highly publicized article, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, Lina Khan brought to 
attention how antitrust law is not prepared to limit Amazon’s predatory 
pricing and data exploitation.22  This article sparked a greater conversation 
 
 14. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2286. 
 15. See generally Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the 
Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401 (2014); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities:  
Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018); Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-
Opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275 (2018). 
 16. Stucke, supra note 15, at 306. 
 17. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 18. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-
antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/RD5E-FTPQ].  These concerns are being 
taken seriously by regulators. See Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Hearings Add to Efforts That Threaten 
Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/ 
technology/ftc-hearings-technology.html [https://perma.cc/UJK4-UR4B] (crediting Khan 
with some of the impetus for the reemergence of antitrust).  Still, there has been backlash from 
those who feel this movement is based in populist fear and that antitrust is an improper remedy 
for corporate power and issues of income inequality. See generally Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in 
a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714 (2018). 
 19. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 118 (2018).  Quickly, this has become a mainstream political issue, fostering unlikely 
bipartisan alliances. See Nellie Bowles, Fighting Big Tech Makes for Some Uncomfortable 
Bedfellows, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/technology/ 
big-tech-strange-bedfellows.html [https://perma.cc/2PP5-6EVW]. 
 20. See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Jack Nicas, E.U. Fines Google $5.1 Billion in Android 
Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/ 
technology/google-eu-android-fine.html [https://perma.cc/P7QR-9XDF]. 
 21. See, e.g., Lina Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127 
YALE L.J.F. 960 (2018).  See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:  ANTITRUST IN THE 
NEW GILDED AGE (2018). 
 22. See Khan, supra note 1, at 716–17. 
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about what the role of antitrust is and what it should be.23  AmEx was widely 
discussed in popular media as a battleground of sorts for this conversation.  
Media and consumer advocates worried that a decision in American 
Express’s favor would act as a shield to tech platforms,24 while tech 
companies feared the broad implications of an outcome in the plaintiff’s 
favor.25  While the Court did rule in American Express’s favor, the holding 
appears narrower than either side feared.26  However, in the Court’s framing 
of the decision around indirect network effects,27 there still exists some 
ambiguity about how it will apply to some tech companies like Amazon. 
This Note argues that the fairest and most accurate way to interpret AmEx’s 
new market definition guidelines is to exclude Amazon Marketplace and 
similarly situated platforms because these platforms have competitive 
constraints that distinguish them from credit card platforms.  While the 
political discourse around big tech’s power has led to a variety of policy 
proposals,28 this Note will focus only on the role of tech platforms in the 
context of antitrust litigation.  In Part I, this Note provides background on 
two-sided platforms, profiles their rise in economics literature, and 
distinguishes different types and their effects.  Part II discusses antitrust 
review of anticompetitive behavior, with special focus given to some of 
Amazon’s practices.  Part II then focuses on the role of market definition in 
antitrust review and discusses the scholarship and case law around two-sided 
“transaction” platforms leading up to AmEx.  Part III discusses three potential 
interpretations addressing whether AmEx should apply to platforms like 
Amazon Marketplace.  Lastly, Part IV argues for a new classification of two-
 
 23. See id.  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust 
Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2019). 
 24. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Opinion, The Supreme Court Case That Could Give Tech 
Giants More Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/ 
opinion/the-supreme-court-case-that-could-give-tech-giants-more-power.html 
[https://perma.cc/8K38-PRD7]; see also Washington Bytes, Will the Supreme Court’s Amex 
Decision Shield Dominant Tech Platforms from Antitrust Scrutiny?, FORBES (July 18, 2018, 
6:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2018/07/18/antitrust-enforcement-
of-dominant-tech-platforms-in-the-post-american-express-world/ [https://perma.cc/8GEA-
Z3XC]; Greg Stohr & David McLaughlin, American Express Case Could Shield Tech Giants 
from Antitrust Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2018, 4:09 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-25/u-s-supreme-court-backs-american-express-
on-credit card-suit-jiucffg9 [https://perma.cc/55ZE-PQNE]. 
 25. See Why Tech Companies Are Worried About the Ohio v. Amex Case, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 8, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ 
impacts-ohio-vs-amex/ [https://perma.cc/2MH6-M87K]. 
 26. See, e.g., Mark MacCarthy, Opinion, Ohio v. American Express Is Sensible Antitrust 
Policy, CIO (Aug. 7, 2018, 4:30 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/3295539/regulation/ohio-
v-american-express-is-sensible-antitrust-policy.html [https://perma.cc/7F4N-U7VU]. 
 27. See AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018). 
 28. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Tech’s Biggest Antitrust Problem May Be a Congressman 
from Rhode Island, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-14/tech-s-biggest-antitrust-problem-
may-be-a-congressman-from-rhode-island [https://perma.cc/T8ZV-EW7E]; Elizabeth 
Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https:// 
medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https:// 
perma.cc/84EF-PJ6V]. 
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sided transaction platforms, which should be exempt from AmEx’s definition 
of two-sidedness. 
I.  TWO-SIDED TRANSACTION PLATFORMS 
Although AmEx is the first federal case to refer specifically to two-sided 
platforms,29 in embrace of recent learning in economics, these types of firms 
have arguably been the subjects of antitrust review for decades.30  Until 
AmEx, these platforms had been dealt with on an ad hoc basis, 
undistinguished from other types of firms.31  Meanwhile, economic analysis 
of two-sided platforms exploded, with hundreds of papers written since the 
early 2000s.32  These firms are difficult to analyze through an antitrust lens 
because they are not only structured differently from others, but also 
impacted differently—on one or both sides—depending on the restraint in 
question.33  Part I.A discusses the evolving definitions of two-sided 
platforms, as well as their distinguishing features relative to traditional, 
single-sided firms.  Part I.B identifies three different types of platforms that 
have emerged from scholarly literature, and Part I.C discusses how Amazon 
and similarly situated tech platforms may be categorized. 
A.  Defining and Distinguishing Two-Sided Platforms 
In trying to parse out what makes a two-sided platform different from any 
other type of firm, Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz aptly point out the 
complications that have emerged, writing, “[a]n unusual feature of two-sided 
markets is that there is no consensus regarding what they are.”34  While credit 
card networks are perhaps a paradigmatic example of a two-sided market, as 
they act as intermediaries to enable a transaction between cardholders and 
merchants, the line blurs when considering advertising-supported media, 
health insurance plans, manufacturers, and other intermediaries between 
groups.35  Adding to the confusion and employing skepticism about whether 
two-sided platforms amount to anything significant at all, Justice Breyer, 
writing for the dissent in AmEx, argued that, as the Court defined the term, 
 
 29. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2298 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I can find no case from this Court 
using those words.”); Evans, supra note 4, at 2. 
 30. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610 (1953) 
(noting that “every newspaper is a dual trader in . . . news and advertising content”). 
 31. Hovenkamp, supra note 13 (manuscript at 5) (noting that “while a few opinions had 
recognized the relevant commercial environment as involving distinct but highly-interrelated 
strands of transactions, this typically amounted to little more than a passing observation.”). 
 32. See David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided 
Platform Businesses, in 1 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 
404, 404–05 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2014). 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. Hermalin & Katz, supra note 3, at 111–12. 
 35. Id. 
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nearly any business can be analyzed through a two-sided lens.36  This section 
will discuss the defining features of two-sided transaction platforms.37 
1.  Definitions 
Contributing to the difficulty in determining the implications and 
precedential value of AmEx is the “disturbing lack of consensus” on the 
definition of two-sided platforms.38  Economists Jean-Charles Rochet and 
Jean Tirole, responsible for much of the foundational scholarship on two-
sided platforms, have defined them in terms of their ability to resolve 
externalities that prevent cross-platform users from contracting efficiently.39  
According to this definition, a market is two-sided if the volume of 
transactions varies with a change of price to one side and holds the total price 
charged constant.40  Similarly, David S. Evans argues that two-sided 
platforms solve a transaction cost problem by serving as an intermediary 
between the two sides41 and giving users access to a much wider variety of 
opportunities for exchange.42  Subsequent economic scholarship has defined 
two-sided platforms in terms of three key features:  (1) distinct services to 
two distinct sides, (2) cross-platform network effects, and (3) market power 
resulting in setting the prices on both sides.43  However, because this 
definition is purely academic and never intended to inform antitrust review, 
some note that it is too arbitrary and manipulable to suffice in court.44 
 
 36. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2300 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“As the economists who 
coined the term explain, if a ‘two-sided market’ meant simply that a firm connects two 
different groups of customers via a platform, then ‘pretty much any market would be two-
sided, since buyers and sellers need to be brought together for markets to exist and gains from 
trade to be realized.’” (quoting Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two–Sided Markets:  A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 646 (2006))). 
 37. Note that while much scholarship discusses multisided as opposed to two-sided 
platforms, and many platforms may have more than two sides, the distinction does little to 
change the analysis. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two–Sided Markets:  A Progress 
Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645, 645 n.1 (2006) (“The insights obtained for two-sided 
platforms apply more generally to multi-sided ones.”); cf. David S. Evans, The Antitrust 
Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 328 (2003) (“Platform 
businesses compete in ‘multi-sided markets.’”). 
 38. Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement, 127 
YALE L.J. 2142, 2148 (2018). 
 39. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 37, at 657; see also AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2300 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“The defining feature of a ‘two-sided market,’ according to these economists, is 
that ‘the platform can affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the 
market and reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount.’” (quoting Rochet 
& Tirole, supra note 37, at 664–65)). 
 40. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 37, at 648. 
 41. Evans, supra note 37, at 379.  Transaction costs may include search costs, bargaining 
and decision costs, and policing and enforcement costs. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of 
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979). 
 42. Bertin Martens, An Economic Policy Perspective on Online Platforms 6 (Joint 
Research Ctr. of the European Comm’n, Working Paper No. 2016/05, 2016). 
 43. E. Glen Weyl, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1642, 
1643 (2010). 
 44. Katz & Sallet, supra note 38, at 2149 (arguing that any firm sets its prices for inputs 
and outputs by treating the prices it pays for inputs as prices).  But see Marc Rysman, The 
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Despite its unsettled definition, many argue that the defining characteristic 
of two-sided platforms is the presence of indirect cross-platform network 
effects (“indirect network effects”)45—i.e., the value of the platform for a 
customer on one side of the market increases as more customers on the other 
side of the market participate.46  For example, as more consumers have 
American Express cards, the cards become more valuable to merchants, who 
will then accept the cards and vice versa.47  Store owners do not want to 
invest in technology and contracts for credit cards that consumers do not use, 
while cardholders do not want credit cards that stores will refuse to accept.48  
The platform must then not only balance prices on each side (“price 
distribution”) in order to maintain customers on both sides but must also 
address the universal concern of price (“price level”).49  If it fails to do so, 
the interdependence of demand creates the risk of cascading decreased 
participation on both sides.50  But some competition law experts warn against 
using the existence of a cross-platform network externality to distinguish 
two-sided from one-sided platforms because it may not matter for a given 
concern being investigated.51  The most recent contribution to the two-sided 
platform definition has been from Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright, who 
differentiate platforms that foster a direct interaction between sides from 
resellers that do not and argue that a firm may switch between the two 
categories when advantageous.52 
Despite this continued debate, in AmEx, the Court simply defined two-
sided platforms as “firm[s that] offer[] different products or services to two 
different groups who both depend on the platform to intermediate between 
them.”53  The Court then noted that two-sided platforms “often” exhibit 
indirect network effects.54  That is, each side’s demand for the platform’s 
service depends not only on the price it is charged by the platform but also 
 
Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 127 (2009) (arguing that a broad 
definition is not inherently problematic, but the more important inquiry is “how important 
two-sided issues are in determining outcomes of interest”). 
 45. The cross-platform indirect network effects discussed in this Note differ from intra-
platform network effects, which arise when the value of a good or service to a user rises as the 
number of other users of that good or service rises. See Hermalin & Katz, supra note 3, at 
112–13.  For example, an increase in Facebook users is of value to a given Facebook user 
because more potential friends (direct) and developers will have more incentive to improve 
Facebook services (indirect). See id. 
 46. Evans, supra note 37, at 332. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Patrick R. Ward, Comment, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects in Antitrust 
Market Definition, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2059, 2075 n.97 (2017). 
 49. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. 
EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 990 (2003). 
 50. Katz & Sallet, supra note 38, at 2151. 
 51. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Market 
Definition, at 49, OECD Doc. DAF/COMP(2012)19 (Oct. 11, 2012), http:// 
www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PLX-RPE3]. 
 52. See generally Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Marketplace or Reseller?, 61 MGMT. 
SCI. 184 (2015). 
 53. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018). 
 54. Id. 
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on the number of users participating on the other side.55  Further adding to 
the confusion, different types of two-sided platforms inherently function 
differently, which may impact how to analyze their performance.56 
2.  Distinct Features of Two-Sided Platforms 
Two-sided platforms have distinctive economic features that make their 
antitrust analysis more complicated than for their single-sided counterparts.  
Many of these features stem from the platforms’ indirect network effects and 
relate to pricing.57 
a.  Indirect Network Effects, Critical Mass, and Externalities 
The indirect network effects that two-sided platforms experience are 
twofold:  usage externalities and membership externalities.58  A usage 
externality refers to the need for two sides of the platform to act together 
through the platform to create value.59  For example, Uber drivers and riders 
can only enter into a value-increasing exchange if they can get together.60  
Both drivers and riders benefit when they use the app to “match” with each 
other.61  Further, Uber increases the value of these usage externalities by 
increasing the quality of the matches, for example by using location-tracking 
to pair drivers and riders who are close to one another.62 
There is a membership externality, on the other hand, where the value to 
each side increases as more members participate on either side.63  Using the 
Uber example, drivers benefit from more riders being on the app, and vice 
versa.  This results in a positive feedback loop, where more users on one side 
attract more users on the other, which fuels growth.64 
The platform plays a crucial role in creating these indirect network effects.  
For this reason, research shows that aspiring platforms must achieve enough 
users on each side to secure what is known as a critical mass to propel indirect 
network effects.65  That is, without a critical mass of users—or a sufficient 
amount of users to establish minimal demand—on each side, platforms will 
offer little value to users on either side, and this prevents more users from 
participating in the platform.66  This is often referred to as a “chicken and 
egg” problem, as bringing more users on board on one side of the market 
 
 55. See, e.g., Julian Wright, One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets, 3 REV. NETWORK 
ECON. 44, 47 (2004). 
 56. See infra Part I.B. 
 57. Rysman, supra note 44, at 137. 
 58. Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 32, at 410–11. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. (using instead an example of a restaurant reservation platform). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 431–33. 
 66. Id. 
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requires more users on the other side.67  Platforms may achieve critical mass 
in a number of ways, including through pricing, product design, and 
marketing.68  However, without a critical mass, a platform is not viable; 
without a critical mass of Uber drivers, prospective passengers will not gain 
utility from the app, and vice versa.69 
This specific concern for two-sided platforms creates an environment 
where a market’s efficiency, at least in digital markets, is maximized with 
only a few firms, each seeking control of the market.70  As a product or 
service becomes more popular, it trends toward dominance because its 
network effects give each consuming user increased utility, which in turn 
attracts more users.71  The firm’s dominance then creates barriers to entry 
wherein competition tends to come from outside of the market because of the 
firm’s power.72  In online markets, some claim that entry barriers are low 
because competition is “one click away.”73 However, others suggest that the 
more data an online market gathers about its users, the more the company 
can harness its network effects to tailor its product to its users with a scope 
that newcomers may not have access to.74  For example, because of the 
amount of personalized user data Google gathers through its various features 
including Gmail, YouTube, and Google Maps, it may be able to identify 
whether a user that searches for “apple” desires results pertaining to the fruit 
or the company.75  Additionally, data accumulation creates an information 
asymmetry where platforms have access to significant data unavailable to 
both sides of its market and a capacity to leverage that data to disadvantage 
platform participants.76  Indeed, the market conditions under which platforms 
operate can create efficiencies for users, but these efficiencies only arise 
when the platform is able to get both sides on board. 
 
 67. See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power Through Tying 
and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 9–10 (2015). 
 68. See Evans, supra note 37, at 350. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Khan, supra note 1, at 785 (noting that indirect network effects and control over 
data in online two-sided markets promote this “winner-take-all” type of environment). 
 71. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Khan, 
supra note 1, at 785 (“[E]arly advantages become self-reinforcing.  The result is that 
technology platform markets will yield to dominance by a small number of firms.”). 
 72. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 163 
(Sibyl Marshall ed., 2016). 
 73. See, e.g, Eric Schmidt, Why Google Works, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-schmidt/why-google-works_b_6502132.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GKQ-SXW4]. 
 74. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 72, at 186; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger & Orly 
Lobel, Platform Market Power, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1051, 1085 (2017) (arguing that two-
sided platforms that collect personal consumer data may raise antitrust concerns including “the 
possibility of anticompetitive price discrimination and exacerbated lock-in effects by 
personalizing the platform experience”). 
 75. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 72, at 188. 
 76. See Bamberger & Lobel, supra note 74, at 1086 (citing Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, 
The Taking Economy:  Uber, Information, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1624 
(2017)). 
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b.  Price-Distribution Focus 
Because of the balance of users on each side, pricing in two-sided 
platforms is more complex than in ordinary businesses.77  While a one-sided 
firm must focus on the price it charges to its customers, or the price level, a 
two-sided platform must attend primarily to the way it distributes its prices 
between its two sides.78  Thus, even holding the price level constant, an 
adjustment to the price distribution, also known as price structure, can affect 
the participation levels of each side.79  The price distribution may even reach 
its equilibrium when one side is not charged at all.  This occurs, for example, 
on ad-supported platforms, like Google, where the site is free for searchers 
but has costs for advertisers.80  Similarly, many credit cards are free for 
consumer-users, but all credit card companies charge merchants a fee for 
each transaction.81 
c.  User Dynamics:  Multi- and Single-Homing 
The ways two-sided platforms compete with each other also differ greatly 
from one-sided platforms.  A crucial distinction is whether users on one or 
both sides engage in a process called multi-homing.82  A user multi-homes if 
she uses several competing platforms in an industry and single-homes if she 
only uses one.83  For example, both rideshare drivers and passengers may 
alternate between Uber and Lyft, and thus, these users multi-home.  On the 
other hand, smartphone users only use one operating system and do not 
alternate between iOS and Android, while app developers may make apps for 
both platforms.84  Therefore, users single-home and developers multi-home.  
Multi-homing tends to arise within a given side of a platform if users view 
the alternative platforms as reasonably substitutable and if there are not 
significant fixed costs required to use such platforms.85  Firms may 
encourage or require users on one side to single-home through exclusivity 
contracts.86  All else being equal, if there is more multi-homing on both sides, 
then competing platforms will compete more aggressively, lowering prices.87  
Research shows that when there is single-homing on one side and multi-
homing on the other, platforms have incentives to compete aggressively for 
 
 77. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 37, at 349. 
 78. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 49, at 990 (“Under multisidedness, platforms must 
choose a price structure and not only a price level.”). 
 79. Id. at 997. 
 80. See Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods:  
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 543–44 (2016). 
 81. Evans, supra note 37, at 335–36. 
 82. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 
668, 669 (2006). 
 83. David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms 6 (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 626, 2013). 
 84. Katz & Sallet, supra note 38, at 2155–60. 
 85. Hovenkamp, supra note 13 (manuscript at 17). 
 86. Evans, supra note 37, at 356. 
 87. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 49, at 1004. 
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the single-homing customer.88  Therefore, it is confusing to speak of the 
competitiveness of the market for two-sided platforms because there are two 
potential markets with different competitive conditions.89 
B.  Types of Two-Sided Platforms:  The Transaction Distinction 
Although there may not be consensus on what defines a two-sided platform 
or when it matters that a platform is two-sided, it is evident that there are 
different types of multisided platforms, differentiated by, among other things, 
the inherent value of their product to their users.  This is important because 
firms structured differently may compete with different parties, and this 
requires different economic and antitrust analyses.  This section gives an 
overview of the different types of firms and distinguishes them from one 
another. 
1.  Transaction and Exchange Platforms 
The most studied type of platform is what this Note will refer to as the 
transaction platform, also known as the “market-maker.”90  This is not only 
where American Express and Amazon Marketplace fit in but also includes 
rideshare apps, online markets and their offline analogues, and dating 
websites.91  A transaction platform may either provide a marketplace for 
buyers and sellers to complete their transaction—which reduces the 
transaction costs associated with buyers and sellers finding one another—or, 
in the case of the credit card market, facilitate the means of the transaction 
between buyers and sellers who have already found one another.92  These 
markets are characterized by the observability of the transaction between the 
users of their corresponding sides (e.g., buyers and sellers).93  That is, both 
merchants and cardholders are aware that they are transacting.94  Competing 
transaction platforms are typically considered substitutes by both buyers and 
sellers.95  For example, a buyer can buy and a seller can sell on eBay instead 
of Amazon Marketplace.  Further, and importantly, the platform itself derives 
its value only from connecting its two sides; the platform itself has no 
inherent value.96  Thus, for a transaction platform to be valuable, it must rely 
heavily on indirect network effects. 
 
 88. Armstrong, supra note 82, at 680. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Evans, supra note 37, at 334; see also Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market Definition 
in Two-Sided Markets:  Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 293, 298 (2014). 
 91. Evans, supra note 37, at 334. 
 92. See id. at 335.  For this reason, some have distinguished transaction platforms and 
exchange platforms. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization 
of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 153–56 (2007). 
 93. Filistrucchi et al., supra note 90, at 302. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 303.  For example, American Express may differentiate its product as a more 
upscale alternative to other brands of credit cards. 
 96. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 49, at 990 (“Cardholders value credit or debit cards 
only to the extent that these are accepted by the merchants they patronize.”). 
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2.  Ad-Supported Platforms 
This Note refers to the other major type of two-sided platform as an ad-
supported platform.  Also described as “audience-makers”97 or, perhaps 
more confusingly, “media platforms,”98 ad-supported platforms operate 
through a business model that seeks to match advertisers with consumers.  
They typically include television, radio, and internet content providers.  
Unlike transaction platforms, ad-supported platforms contain inherent value 
for consumers,99 while consumers are generally indifferent to advertisers.100  
For this reason, there is a clear indirect network effect between advertisers 
and viewers (or readers or users) because advertisers value ad-supported 
platforms with more viewers.101  However, unlike transaction platforms, 
based on the premise that viewers may be indifferent to advertising, the 
indirect network effect between viewers and advertisers is less clear.102 
Even though there is an interaction between the advertiser and the 
consumer through the platform, it is generally not observable to the 
platform.103  That is, if there is a transaction (sale) between the advertiser and 
the consumer, it is delayed—and does not occur on the platform itself—but 
rather through the means specified in the advertisement.104  Unlike 
transaction platforms, ad-supported platforms do not set the terms of the 
transaction between the two sides.105  Furthermore, the platforms with which 
the advertisers compete will be very different from those with which the 
consumers compete.106  That is, users will appraise substitutability by the 
type of content on the platform, while advertisers will focus on factors like 
the market catered to and how the ads are delivered.107  For example, while 
Netflix and Hulu may be competitors for users, advertisers may decide 
between placing ads in a wider variety of media, e.g., newspapers, video ads, 
banner ads, and more.108 
3.  Software Platforms 
An additional distinct type of two-sided platform is the software platform, 
which provides services that link app developers and app users.109  Operating 
 
 97. Evans, supra note 37, at 335. 
 98. Katz & Sallet, supra note 38, at 2156. 
 99. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 13 (manuscript at 16) (noting that because of the 
inherent value of the products, advertising may be used as an alternative or supplement to 
price).  See generally Evans, supra note 37. 
 100. Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953). 
 101. See Filistrucchi et al., supra note 90, at 323–24. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 298. 
 104. Id. at 298 n.11. 
 105. See id. (“[A]t best only a delayed transaction is present . . . and this transaction is not 
identifiable.”). 
 106. Id. at 298. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Evans & Noel, supra note 7, at 697–98 (discussing the varied competitive 
environments among one- and two-sided platforms). 
 109. Id. at 678–79. 
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systems like iOS, OSX, Android, and Windows, as well as video game 
consoles like Xbox and PlayStation, function by permitting users to run the 
developers’ applications only if the users have the same software platform 
on which the developers relied to create their application.110  In the case of 
operating systems, platform owners derive the bulk of their revenue from 
users buying the device on which the platform exists, and developers may 
obtain access to platform services for free.111  Because of this imbalance, no 
single market-share metric accurately summarizes the position of, for 
example, competing video game platforms, and, to understand the market 
dynamics, it is important to consider both the competitors’ shares of video 
console sales and their shares of game sales.112 
C.  Complex, Vertically Integrated Platforms:  Amazon 
The largest tech companies, including Amazon, Google, Facebook, and 
Apple, in their widespread growth and diversification, contain elements of 
all of the aforementioned types of platforms.113  Amazon is “best understood 
as a retail, shipping, and logistics platform that operates as the infrastructure 
for twenty-first century retail.”114  Amazon acts as a transaction platform 
through Amazon Marketplace by facilitating transactions between third-
party sellers and users.115  Amazon also functions as an ad-supported 
platform by hosting ads throughout its website for both products sold on 
Amazon and external products and services.116  Third, Amazon has software 
platform features as well, including its Kindle device and app, which is a 
platform where Amazon connects e-book readers with publishers and 
writers.117  Amazon also dominates in infrastructure and logistics, operating 
by far the largest cloud-computing platform,118 as well as Fulfillment By 
Amazon (FBA)—a logistics and delivery service for independent sellers.119  
 
 110. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET DEFINITION IN ANTITRUST:  
THEORY AND CASE STUDIES 448 (2012).  Note that exceptions exist in the form of open-source 
operating systems and software. 
 111. Evans & Noel, supra note 7, at 679. 
 112. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 110, at 448. 
 113. See, e.g., David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Internet Economy, 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 295 (2008) (identifying Google as an “interconnected web 
ecosystem”).  While this Note focuses on Amazon, much of the legal and empirical 
scholarship on Google is useful by analogy. 
 114. Rahman, supra note 15, at 1675. 
 115. Khan, supra note 1, at 710. 
 116. Video Ads, AMAZON ADVERT., https://advertising.amazon.com/products/video-
ads/?ref_=a20m_us_gw_valm [https://perma.cc/UJ7K-9GAN] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 117. See infra Part II.B.1.  For further discussion of antitrust analysis of Amazon’s e-book 
practices, see generally John B. Kirkwood, Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer:  
Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 118. Ron Miller, AWS Continues to Rule the Cloud Infrastructure Market, TECHCRUNCH 
(Oct. 30, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/30/aws-continues-to-rule-the-cloud-
infrastructure-market/ [https://perma.cc/6EEH-V8CX]. 
 119. Fulfillment by Amazon, AMAZON SERVICES, https://services.amazon.com/fulfillment-
by-amazon/benefits.htm [https://perma.cc/K3LS-V48E] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
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These services, when used in tandem, create efficiencies through vertical 
integration that greatly benefit consumers.120 
Amazon’s third-party marketplace, the largest e-retailer with 31.3 percent 
of e-commerce market share,121 is to some degree a typical transaction 
platform, in that it links buyers and sellers of both new and used products 
through its website and mobile app.122  Notably, one of the competitors that 
sellers compete with is Amazon itself.  Amazon contracts with manufacturers 
separately to sell products directly to consumers with free two-day shipping 
through a service called Amazon Prime.123  However, this service is not 
offered by default to other Amazon Marketplace sellers.124  Amazon Prime 
membership requires a consumer to pay an annual fee for free shipping as 
well as other perks.125  A subset of Amazon Prime items are manufactured 
by Amazon, most identifiably under the AmazonBasics product line.126  So 
when a shopper seeks to buy, for example, a stapler, she may buy an 
AmazonBasics-brand stapler from Amazon, or alternatively an outside-brand 
stapler through a third-party seller on Amazon.127 
For products that are available from a variety of sellers, including Amazon 
itself, the list of all sellers is made available; however, 82 percent of sales are 
made without consideration, through Amazon’s “buy-box.”128  The buy-box 
is simply Amazon’s add-to-cart button, which algorithmically chooses the 
default seller for a customer, updating in real time.129  Price is the most 
important feature used by the buy-box algorithm to select the default seller, 
but it is not determinative, as customer feedback and ratings of the seller are 
also used.130  As of 2017, the buy-box algorithm is used even for products 
that Amazon sells directly.131  Thus, Amazon Marketplace may be thought 
of as a transaction platform that also competes with its seller side. 
 
 120. 3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 755 (“Vertical integration occurs when a 
firm provides for itself some input that it might otherwise purchase on the market.  As a result, 
the input is said to be produced within the firm rather than purchased from another firm.”). 
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MARKETPLACE PULSE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.marketplacepulse.com/articles/amazon-
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 128. Id. at 20. 
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 130. Le Chen et al., An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace, 
25TH INT’L WORLD WIDE WEB CONF. 1341 (April 2016), http://gdac.uqam.ca/WWW2016-
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 131. See Jim Milliot, Publishers Are Urged to Monitor Amazon Buy Buttons, PUBLISHERS 
WKLY. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/ 
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For the bulk of Amazon’s services, both customers and vendors multi-
home.132  For example, third-party sellers may sell their products through 
other platforms, and users, also, may buy the products through other 
platforms.  However, users may come close to single-homing through use of 
Amazon Prime for their online retail needs to justify the upfront fixed cost 
that they paid to enroll in the service.133  Indeed, data suggests that less than 
1 percent of Amazon Prime members are likely to consider competitor retail 
sites in the same shopping session.134  This percentage may reflect high 
switching costs—those “borne by customers who have already purchased a 
product and who would then incur some cost in switching to another 
product.”135  Switching-cost analysis may also be extended from price alone 
to account for the difficulty of breaking a habit like shopping primarily on 
Amazon Prime.136  Near single-homing by users makes Amazon evermore 
valuable for vendors, as vendors may not consider competing platforms 
equally substitutable.  Thus, these indirect network effects create conditions 
akin to single-homing on the seller side, and some vendors have expressed 
that they have no choice but to sell on Amazon despite being unable to 
compete.137 
Lastly, through its vertical integration, Amazon is able to collect a variety 
of consumer data in real time about “which products are sold to whom, at 
what price, and which packaging or incentives work.”138  Said data, in 
addition to helping Amazon understand its consumers, may also provide 




 132. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol & Jingyuan Ma, Understanding Online Markets and 
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 135. PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 1997). 
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 137. See, e.g., Jennifer Rankin, Third-Party Sellers and Amazon—A Double-Edged Sword 
in E-Commerce, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2015, 9:31 AM), https://www.theguardian.com// 
technology/2015/jun/23/amazon-marketplace-third-party-seller-faustian-pact [https:// 
perma.cc/W56J-GZGM]. 
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determine “what firms [it] should block, which [it] should buy, and how [it] 
should grow strategically.”139 
II.  ANTITRUST REVIEW OF TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 
Like single-sided firms, the anticompetitive practices of two-sided 
platforms are subject to review by courts and regulators, who seek to promote 
fair competition for consumers’ benefit.140  In AmEx, the practice in question 
was a contractual restriction by American Express that prohibited merchants 
from steering customers away from American Express to a card with lower 
merchant fees at the point of sale.141  Specifically, merchants who accepted 
American Express cards were prohibited from asking consumers to pay with 
a different (Visa, Mastercard, or Discover) card.142  This section will give 
background on potentially anticompetitive restraints and how they are 
litigated and investigated through antitrust law, and it will pay special 
attention to platforms that may now be identified as two-sided in the 
aftermath of AmEx.  Part II.A of this section provides an introduction to 
antitrust review and the tests courts and regulators use to assess the specific 
practices in dispute.  Next, Part II.B discusses a common factor in the 
aforementioned tests used for two-sided platforms and the test used in AmEx:  
both define the relevant market that an antitrust defendant’s allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct impacts (“market definition”).  Specifically, this 
section discusses how and for what purpose courts determine market 
definition, as well as scholarship debating how to properly define relevant 
markets of two-sided platforms prior to AmEx.  Finally, Part II.C discusses 
specific business practices and restraints of trade for which market definition 
could be crucial to the outcome of platform litigation, as it was in AmEx, with 
examples discussing Amazon’s practices in particular. 
A.  Antitrust Review Generally 
As discussed earlier, prior to AmEx, antitrust case law regarding two-sided 
platforms, transactional or otherwise, developed outside the context of 
economics literature.  Based on the type of behavior litigated or investigated, 
the analysis varied.  This section contains an overview of antitrust causes of 
action particularly regarding two-sided platforms. 
1.  Sherman Act § 1 and the Rule of Reason Test as Applied to Horizontal 
and Vertical Restraints 
Anticompetitive practices are typically litigated under one of two statutes, 
both of which are more judicial than statutory in nature143:  the Sherman 
 
 139. Id. at 50. 
 140. See, e.g., Evans & Noel, supra note 7, at 669. 
 141. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2277 (2018); see also Evans, supra note 83, at 13–14 
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 142. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2277.  
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204 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Antitrust Act144 and the Clayton Antitrust Act.145  Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.”146  
Section 2 focuses specifically on monopolizing or attempting or conspiring 
to do so.147 
Restraints of trade may be unreasonable in one of two ways:  (1) 
unreasonable per se because they “always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition and decrease output”148 or (2) under the rule of reason test, 
which requires a fact-specific assessment of market power and structure to 
assess a restraint’s actual effect on competition.149  Restraints litigated 
through the rule of reason test are typically separated into horizontal and 
vertical categories.150  This distinction is important; horizontal restraints—
anticompetitive conduct done in coordination with competitors—is provided 
less leeway and punished more harshly than conduct that occurs within a firm 
at various levels of distribution (vertical).151  That is, there is a presumption 
that a firm acting in coordination with others has more power and less of a 
procompetitive rationale than a firm acting alone.152  Because agreements 
among distributors are such an ordinary and necessary part of business,153 
vertical restraints are only found unlawful when they are unreasonable.  They 
are found to be unreasonable when they reduce output which increases prices 
in relation to costs.154 
The rule of reason test, which attempts to assess the reasonableness of a 
particular restraint, is a multipronged, burden-shifting test that seeks to 
compare the competitive effects of challenged behavior relative to 
alternatives, such as abandonment or a less restrictive substitute.155  The 
plaintiff has the initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has an 
anticompetitive effect that harms customers in the relevant market.156  If the 
plaintiff meets this burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show a 
procompetitive rationale.157  If the defendant makes this showing, the burden 
then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the procompetitive efficiencies 
 
 144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
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 156. Id. ¶ 1502. 
 157. Id. 
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could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.158  The 
plaintiff’s need to satisfy the initial burden is crucial because 95 percent of 
rule of reason cases are won or lost at the first step.159 
Regarding the first prong of the rule of reason test, the plaintiff can show 
a restraint’s anticompetitive effects either directly by evidence of actual 
detrimental effects on competition, such as reduced output or increased 
prices in the relevant market,160 or indirectly by proof of market power plus 
some evidence that the restraint harms competition.161  Usually, to prove 
anticompetitive effects, the plaintiff must define the relevant market.162  But 
the method of defining the market, and even the underlying purpose of how 
to do so, is not settled, especially as applied to two-sided platforms and their 
many variants.163 
2.  Predatory Pricing:  The Brooke Group Test 
Although antitrust law is not usually concerned with setting a limit on price 
competition, under certain conditions, low prices may have anticompetitive 
effects.164  Predatory pricing occurs when a platform attempts to drive rivals 
out of business by lowering prices or issuing subsidies to one or several of 
the groups it serves.165  After driving said rival out of business, the platform 
can then raise prices or reduce subsidies to recoup its losses.166 
Predatory pricing claims do not rely upon the Sherman Act § 1 rule of 
reason but instead on the Robinson-Patman Act167 or section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.168  The elements for a prima facie claim are virtually identical 
under each act, but the Sherman Act requires a higher standard of proof.169 
While claims are brought under the aforementioned statutes, courts use the 
two-part test introduced in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
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1073 (11th Cir. 2004); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 162. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007); 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982); see also Louis Kaplow, 
Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010). 
 163. See infra Part II.C. 
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Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219–20 (1979). 
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 167. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). 
 168. Id. § 2. 
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206 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Tobacco Corp.170 to decide predatory pricing cases.171  In this test, plaintiffs 
must show that the defendant’s price was below an appropriate measure of 
cost and that the defendant had a dangerous probability of recouping its 
upfront losses through enhanced market power.172  This test is difficult to 
satisfy by design, as the Court did not want to condemn procompetitive and 
consumer-friendly price cuts.173  Despite predatory pricing’s different test, 
market definition must occur nonetheless because “[s]uccess requires not just 
below-cost pricing but a product market that will allow the would-be 
monopolist to raise prices later without the threat of new market entrants.”174 
B.  Market Definition Is Applied in the Rule of Reason and Brooke Group 
Tests 
Defining the relevant market in which an allegedly monopolizing firm 
competes is a necessary inquiry under both the rule of reason175 and Brooke 
Group tests.176  While the ultimate goal of defining the relevant market is 
undeniably to determine whether a firm has power in said market,177 the 
method used to properly define it has evolved over time, and it was an issue 
of first impression in AmEx with respect to two-sided platforms 
specifically.178  And although courts and regulators alike have reasoned that 
it is not always necessary to define the relevant market, especially when there 
is direct evidence of power over and harm to said market,179 Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has shown market definition to be an important inquiry. 
What is clear is that to define a market is to identify producers providing 
customers of a firm with alternative sources for the firm’s product or 
service.180  A market is the arena where significant substitution in 
consumption or production occurs.181  A properly defined market excludes 
suppliers whose products are different (not within the product market) or who 
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 171. Id. at 222–24. 
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Cir. 2001) (recognizing the use of anticompetitive effects alone to demonstrate market power). 
 180. 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 530. 
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do not compete in the same geographic market.182  Depending on the 
characteristics of the market, a firm’s raise in price of its product may make 
substitutes more attractive to buyers and entry more attractive to sellers.183  
For example, if Uber raises its prices, Lyft may appeal to riders who do not 
wish to pay the increased price. 
The emergence of defining relevant markets in antitrust may be traced to 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,184 where the Supreme Court 
opined that “[e]very manufacturer is the sole producer of the particular 
commodity it makes but its control [over price] depends upon the availability 
of alternative commodities for buyers.”185  The du Pont Court framed the 
initial scope of the inquiry for market definition:  “products that have 
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced—
price, use and qualities considered.”186  However, the Court failed to find a 
monopoly by defining the relevant market as all flexible packaging materials 
instead of cellophane specifically.187  This is now referred to as the 
“cellophane fallacy” because while some consumers may have viewed some 
other products as substitutes for cellophane, it was only because cellophane 
was too expensive as a result of du Pont’s monopolistic pricing.188  Thus, du 
Pont shows that failing to consider the market conditions may result in an 
overbroad definition. 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,189 a few years after du Pont, the Court 
reinforced its interchangeability approach but did not fall victim to the same 
fallacy.  The Court expanded on du Pont by explaining that within a “broad 
market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute 
product markets for antitrust purposes.”190  Instead of providing a bright-line 
rule to determine whether one is in a broad market or a submarket, the Court 
provided a list of factors to consider:  (1) industry or public recognition of 
the submarket as a separate economic entity, (2) the product’s peculiar 
characteristics and uses, (3) unique production facilities, (4) distinct 
customers, (5) distinct prices, (6) sensitivity to price changes, and (7) 
specialized vendors.191 
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Later, in both United States v. Grinnell Corp.192 and Eastman Kodak Co. 
v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,193 the Court began to take a more flexible 
approach and placed an emphasis on “commercial realities” in pursuit of a 
practical solution.  In Grinnell, the Court, distinguishing home alarms that 
were centrally monitored from those that were not, held that an overbroad 
definition would not accurately reflect the commercial realities of the market 
because certain portions of the consumer population would not actually 
consider products in the alleged market substitutable.194 
Doubling down on this reasoning almost thirty years later, the Kodak Court 
justified including aftermarket products and services in the relevant market 
for photocopier replacement parts because photocopier owners may have 
considered them interchangeable with Kodak’s parts.195  Thus, the Court’s 
jurisprudence has allowed for, if not encouraged, practical considerations 
when defining relevant markets. 
C.  Specific Practices Through Which Two-Sidedness Could Matter to 
Market Definition Calculation 
While AmEx established that two-sidedness is a consequential inquiry, it 
does not follow that any action against a platform would implicate its two-
sidedness.  This section discusses some of the practices that Amazon 
Marketplace has engaged in that would in fact implicate Amazon’s two-
sidedness. 
1.  Most-Favored-Nation Provisions for Platforms 
One typical vertical restraint is a most-favored-nation provision (an 
“MFN”), also known as a “price parity provision.”196  Some distinguish an 
MFN from a platform MFN.197  The former pertains to agreements between 
sellers and buyers about the prices that sellers will charge other buyers, while 
the latter concerns agreements between sellers and platforms about the prices 
that sellers will charge buyers who will purchase through other platforms.198  
A platform MFN is imposed by the platform on the merchant and requires 
that a merchant refrain from offering its products or services at lower prices 
elsewhere.199  This guarantees that the platform charges the lowest price 
available for the merchant’s product.200  The merchant may agree to the MFN 
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because the platform’s market power restricts its alternatives or because the 
weakened competition also benefits the merchant.201  Evidence suggests that 
MFNs lead to higher prices for consumers by preventing rival discounting 
and/or discouraging entry.202  Further, a 2016 literature review detailed the 
potential of MFNs to soften competition between retailers on the margin 
charged to suppliers, restrict entry at the retailer level, and fully eliminate 
price competition at the retail level.203 
One recent instance of platform MFN litigation was United States v. Apple 
Inc.,204 frequently referred to as the “e-books case.”  Underlying the case, 
Apple planned to release the iPad and sought to gain control of the e-book 
market from Amazon, which possessed over 90 percent of the market.205  To 
do so, Apple instituted an MFN with five e-book publishers wherein the 
publishers set price caps for e-books, and, if a certain book was offered more 
cheaply elsewhere (e.g., on Amazon), the publisher was required to reduce 
its price on the Apple iBookstore and, ultimately, receive less in 
commission.206  Here, the Southern District of New York found in favor of 
the plaintiffs, holding that the MFN provisions  
not only protected Apple by guaranteeing it could match the lowest retail 
price listed on any competitor’s e-bookstore, but also imposed a severe 
financial penalty upon the [p]ublisher [d]efendants if they did not force 
Amazon and other retailers similarly to change their business models and 
cede control over e-book pricing to the [p]ublishers.207 
Similarly, through a platform MFN, Amazon Marketplace prohibited 
sellers from offering lower prices on their own sites or any other online 
marketplaces.208  Following pressure from policymakers, Amazon 
eventually removed the provision from its seller terms in the spring of 
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2019,209 several years after doing so in the European Union.210  By 
maintaining the provision, sellers likely suffered substantial lost profits, but 
more crucially, its removal indicates that Amazon’s seller-restrictive 
practices are not necessary ingredients to the company’s success.211 
2.  Predatory Pricing 
Two-sided platforms may use predatory pricing as a means of getting both 
sides on board in pursuit of critical mass212 or by charging unprofitably low 
prices to prevent potential competitors from reaching critical mass.213 
Lina Khan attributes much of Amazon’s success to its willingness to 
forego profits to establish dominance—i.e., predatory pricing.214  She argues 
that Amazon did this in a variety of ways, including through Amazon Prime 
membership, which has been calculated to cost them 1–2 billion dollars every 
year to sustain.215  Similarly, Amazon has foregone profits by pricing 
products below cost, in what could either be considered loss leading or 
predatory pricing.216  Consider the conduct leading up to the e-books case.217  
Amazon priced bestseller e-books below wholesale costs in an attempt to 
capture the market.218  Indeed, Amazon found this strategy successful, as 
Amazon sold around 90 percent of all e-books through 2009.219  Amazon 
was able to recoup its losses through other avenues and major publishers 
feared Amazon’s price point would permanently drive down the price 
consumers would pay for e-books.220  As a result, five publishing companies 
acted together with assistance from Apple to withhold new e-books from 
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Amazon.221  Amazon quickly relented and accepted their pricing terms.222  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) felt that this was a routine case of 
price-fixing by the publishers,223 but in many ways the e-books case has 
come to represent the notion that potentially illegal means are the only ones 
that can slow Amazon down.224 
Although the e-books case is most notorious, it is just one of many 
examples of below-cost pricing that Amazon uses to drive out competitors.  
In some cases, Amazon has sought to acquire competing digital retailers, and, 
when said retailers were not interested, Amazon dropped its prices until the 
companies were pressured to agree.225  For example, Zappos, a smaller 
company with a much larger share of the shoe market than Amazon, sold 
itself to Amazon after Amazon lowered its shoe prices.226  In fact, the larger 
retailer lost “money on each sale” to force the smaller company’s 
surrender.227 
While a predatory pricing challenge to Amazon has long been considered 
untenable because courts consider the practice to be irrational,228 new 
research on Amazon’s business model suggests that it may not be so 
irrational after all.  Without access to Amazon’s internal business records, it 
is impossible to establish that the company is selling products at a loss.  But 
Amazon is recouping costs of operating at a loss not by raising consumer 
prices as would be expected but by shifting those costs onto its marketplace 
sellers.229  “Amazon can sell the same products, for the same price, but push 
more and more vendors to become third-party sellers on the Marketplace—
offloading the costs of fulfillment and allowing Amazon to charge those same 
entities higher fees.”230  Indeed, recent reporting shows that Amazon plans 
to do just this,231 while simultaneously raising prices on its fulfillment 
services that have become nearly essential for sellers.232  This theory of 
predatory pricing is consistent with studies showing that the likelihood of 
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Amazon’s entry into a seller’s market is positively correlated with the 
popularity and customer ratings of the seller’s products.233  By shifting more 
costly transactions to third-party sellers and appropriating less costly 
transactions from sellers for its own benefit, this suggests a viable means of 
recoupment under Brooke Group.234  While this theory is admittedly 
inchoate, it may survive a motion to dismiss in an antitrust case and allow for 
discovery. 
3.  Exclusionary Conduct Resulting from Dual Distribution 
In a dual distribution arrangement, a manufacturer simultaneously sells 
goods or services to independent dealers and to those who might otherwise 
be customers of those dealers.235  For these latter sales, the manufacturer is 
acting as its own dealer, perhaps through an owned division or subsidiary.236  
The manufacturer may thus compete with the independent dealers handling 
its product and might restrict that competition by imposing restraints on the 
independent dealers.237  While dual distribution is not inherently 
anticompetitive and is often practical to expand a firm’s geographic reach, 
antitrust concerns arise when the dual distribution results in the manufacturer 
being in competition with its customer or when customers on different 
competitive levels compete with each other.238 
This hybrid relationship has confused some courts, which have been 
uncertain whether to characterize it as vertical—because it is imposed by the 
manufacturer upon its dealers—or as horizontal—because it is imposed by 
the manufacturer-as-dealer upon rival dealers.239  For example, where Coca-
Cola used bottling companies in some geographic areas and did the bottling 
itself in others, the system was found to be vertical because Coca-Cola 
established the system itself, observed the same restraints as other bottlers, 
and there was no control by or conspiracy with the other licensees.240  
However, other courts have concluded that dual distribution restraints are 
horizontal because the manufacturer and distributor operate on the same 
level.241  Whether the restraint is deemed horizontal or vertical is important 
because it will determine whether the rule of reason is used or whether the 
restraint will be anticompetitive per se.242 
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The dual distribution model, while not perfectly designed for or typically 
associated with two-sided platforms, may be a helpful lens through which to 
view some of Amazon’s practices, specifically in its competition with its own 
third-party sellers.243  To be clear, Amazon’s structure differs from the 
typical dual distribution arrangement, where a manufacturer sells to an 
independent distributor and the distributor’s potential customers (thus 
competing with its customer), as Amazon is better characterized as a seller 
of goods that sells directly to end users but also allows others to sell to end 
users on its platform. 
The dual distribution model has been used in similarly unconventional 
arrangements.  In Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell,244 the Ninth Circuit ruled 
that a manufacturer of microfilm products lawfully maintained a service 
organization to repair and replace its equipment except in one market where 
it authorized a single dealer-representative to make repairs.245  This hybrid 
of dual distributorship and a horizontal relationship could be analyzed as a 
dual distributorship because of its potential procompetitive effects.246  Thus, 
under a slightly different arrangement, Amazon still competes with its 
potential customers in their capacity as sellers, and the dual distribution 
model contains flexibility to account for this practice.247 
And indeed, the European Commission248 and the DOJ249 are investigating 
Amazon for competing with its sellers.  On its face, this behavior is not a 
problem, and could even be procompetitive, but Amazon uses its marketplace 
platform and thus the data of its sellers “as a vast laboratory to spot new 
products to sell, test sales of potential new goods, and exert more control over 
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pricing.”250  Data indicates that Amazon is more likely to begin selling items 
on its retail platform when said items have become popular in its 
marketplace.251  Amazon sells these items at a lower price or draws attention 
from the third-party vendor’s lower price and highlights its own.252  This 
practice minimizes the transaction costs associated with testing the products 
itself and saves Amazon money.253 
In the above instances, Amazon cut out third-party sellers by purchasing 
from the manufacturer directly, but Amazon also has responded to popular 
third-party products by producing and manufacturing cheaper alternatives 
itself.254  Thus, Amazon uses its power, data, and vertical integration to take 
advantage of the fact that some of its customers are also its competitors; 
Amazon sells products only once their success has been tested.255  But even 
after that, Amazon competes advantageously with its third-party sellers and 
steers consumers toward its own products.256  These tactics have results:  
evidence suggests that this practice discourages third-party sellers from 
pursuing growth on Amazon and stifles innovation.257  However, due to the 
vast number of users on Amazon and its underlying market power, third-
party sellers may feel pressure to remain on Amazon Marketplace in spite of 
any anticompetitive tactics.258  The competitive constraints that Amazon is 
able to place on both large companies and individual users put it in a unique 
category of platform, where it can exercise power over users big and small. 
D.  Defining Platforms’ Relevant Markets Before AmEx:  Differing Views 
Even though two-sided platforms have been subject to antitrust review in 
the past,259 their market definition remained unsettled prior to AmEx—and to 
some extent may still be.  Debate prior to the decision centered around 
whether a two-sided platform market definition should encompass one side, 
both sides, or somewhere in between.  Additionally, litigation prior to AmEx 
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defined platforms’ relevant markets through ad hoc reasoning.260  This 
section discusses proposed theories prior to AmEx. 
1.  One-Market View 
Some believe that because two-sided markets’ competitive effects cannot 
be inferred from one side of the market alone, an analysis of market-wide 
output effects is required.261  That is, even if one side of the market 
experiences some burden from a particular restraint, it tends to be offset by a 
significant benefit on the other side.262  According to the proponents of this 
view, the reallocation of costs and benefits across the two sides of a two-
sided market can be output increasing, output reducing, or output neutral; 
however, one cannot distinguish between these scenarios simply by looking 
at the effects on one side.263  Thus, presuming that harm to one side harms 
consumer welfare would lead to errors in antitrust analysis.264  The relevant 
market is then considered the platform itself, and competition with other 
platforms then prevents the platform from harming the market as a whole.265 
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the Court 
considered this view with respect to restraints on aftermarket parts and 
servicing for Kodak copiers but ultimately shied away from it.266  The Court 
recognized that if there was sufficient economic interrelatedness between 
pricing and demand in the market and aftermarket segments of copier 
servicing, then it would be appropriate to characterize the market as a single, 
unified market for purposes of market definition.267  Indeed, the Court 
expressly acknowledged that “[i]t may be that [Kodak’s] parts, service, and 
equipment are components of one unified market, or that the equipment 
market does discipline the aftermarkets so that all three are priced 
competitively overall, or that any anti-competitive effects of Kodak’s 
behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects.”268  But the Court held 
that it could not draw those conclusions as a matter of law on summary 
judgment.269  In so acknowledging, it foreshadowed how the Court would 
rule in AmEx. 
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2.  Two-Market View 
Others have urged different market definitions for each side of the 
platform.  This has traditionally been the approach to antitrust review of ad-
supported platforms like newspapers.270  This approach acknowledges that 
the markets are not similarly situated enough to be analyzed together because 
the sides are not closely linked due to the lack of sufficiently close 
substitutes.271  However, treating transaction platforms this way has been a 
considerably less popular view.  The purported justification for doing so is 
because the interests of the two sides and the competitive conditions on each 
side are not necessarily aligned.272  Separating the sides of the market does 
not ignore two-sidedness because some advocate balancing the effects 
among sides of the market.273  Thus, the inquiry within a two-market 
framework differs depending on whether a separate- or net-effects analysis 
is used.274  A two-market net-effects analysis is very similar to a one-market 
view because both weigh the impact on a restraint on both sides of the market. 
The two-market separate-effects view, advocated by Michael Katz and 
Jonathan Sallet, still accounts for cross-market network effects by 
recognizing that the interests of users on different sides are not fully aligned 
with each other.275  Using the example of credit card transactions, Katz and 
Sallet reason that because merchants desire low fees and consumers desire 
high rewards, neither party is actually interested in the net effect of the 
restraint.276 
Analyzing two geographic markets affected by a potential bank merger, 
the Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank277 reasoned that a 
procompetitive justification in one-market may not offset another even 
though there would be an effect on both cluster markets.278  While not 
explicitly taking a two-market view, or even analyzing two sides of a 
platform, this case provides precedent for the two-market view’s separate-
effects analysis as discussed by Katz and Sallet.  However, even more 
recently, the Second Circuit upheld a Southern District of New York decision 
which defined Visa and MasterCards’ relevant markets as two-sided:  a 
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market for credit cards and a market for card network services (e.g., 
authorization, clearance, and settlement of transactions).279 
3.  Different Markets for Different Types of Platforms 
Many antitrust scholars have advocated for a position somewhere in 
between a one-market and two-market view.  An intuitive variant would treat 
media and other nontransaction two-sided platforms as having two markets 
and payment and other transaction platforms as having one market.280  The 
reasoning for this distinction is that, for a credit card market for example, a 
transaction between the buyer and seller either takes place using American 
Express on both sides or it does not take place through American Express at 
all.281 
In the case of a newspaper, an advertiser may substitute a TV 
advertisement for a newspaper advertisement while a reader may not 
substitute TV for a newspaper, and the transaction thus need only impact one 
side of the market.282  So, it is then the observability of the transaction 
between the two sides that first designates a transaction platform and then 
determines the market definition.283  This also reflects the notion that 
relevant markets are usually defined as comprising substitutable products.284 
One of the few two-sided transaction market cases that took a one-market 
view prior to AmEx was National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.,285 
where NaBanco filed suit against Visa and alleged that Visa violated section 
1 of the Sherman Act by fixing interchange fees.286  The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the Southern District of Florida’s holding that the procompetitive 
effects created by the interchange fee exceeded any anticompetitive 
effects.287  In doing so, the court affirmed the lower court’s definition of the 
relevant market as the market for all payment systems.288  The court 
recognized what would now be deemed a transaction platform as a “joint 
enterprise”—a recognition that reflected the need to get both cardholders and 
merchants onboard.289 
E.  Putting Theory to Practice:  AmEx Introduced Two-Sided Transaction 
Platform Language and Reasoning to American Antitrust Jurisprudence 
At the end of the 2017–2018 Term, the Supreme Court relied heavily on 
the work of David S. Evans and Lapo Filistrucchi to rule not only on the 
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legality of American Express’s steering provisions but, more importantly, on 
the requirements of market definition for two-sided platforms.290  In a 
majority opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court defined two-sided platforms 
as those “offer[ing] different products or services to two different groups who 
both depend on the platform to intermediate between them.”291  Further, the 
Court found that American Express is a transaction platform, of which the 
distinguishing feature is that “they cannot make a sale to one side of the 
platform without simultaneously making a sale to the other.”292  The Court 
reasoned that “[t]wo-sided platforms differ from traditional markets” in that 
they “often exhibit . . . ‘indirect network effects,’” defined by the Court as 
where “the value of the . . . platform to one group of participants depends on 
how many members of a different group participate.”293 
Defining the relevant market as “the ‘arena within which significant 
substitution in consumption or production occurs,’”294 the Court reasoned 
that the relevant market would include both consumers and merchants 
because price increases by two-sided platforms by themselves do not suggest 
anticompetitive effects without evidence that they increased the overall cost 
of the platform’s services.295  The Court then distinguished credit card 
platforms from newspaper advertisement markets and said that courts should 
only consider both sides of the former because “the impacts of indirect 
network effects and relative pricing in [the newspaper] market are minor.”296  
Further, two-sided platforms “facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction 
between participants”297 and a credit card platform “can sell its services only 
if a merchant and cardholder both simultaneously choose to use the 
network.”298 
And thus, the Court concluded, if the platform is two-sided, the first step 
of the rule of reason test must net the competitive effects on both sides of the 
platform by considering both sides of the market.299 
III.  WHAT AMEX MEANS FOR AMAZON 
While the Court unambiguously held that credit card platforms will be 
subject to antitrust review with the market for transactions itself being the 
relevant market, several questions going forward are left unanswered.  
Complex tech platforms like Amazon, Google, and Facebook, for example, 
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may make an AmEx argument if challenged for anticompetitive conduct, and 
courts and regulators must have a workable standard for deciding whether 
AmEx’s need for harm to both sides300 will apply to a given firm.  This 
question is threefold:  (1) what criteria are sufficient to designate a platform 
as two-sided, (2) how do plaintiffs prove these criteria, and (3) which criteria 
must be proven for AmEx to apply.  Embedded within these related questions 
lies one that is broader and more fundamental:  what constitutes a transaction 
platform?  This section first identifies the variables needed for AmEx to apply 
and then discusses where Amazon may fit. 
A.  Eliciting Two-Sidedness Under AmEx 
While the Court’s definition of a two-sided transaction platform, to some 
degree, resembles that of scholarship, the definition going forward will be 
highly variable as there is no consensus.301  The Court’s definition of a two-
sided transaction platform as one “offer[ing] different products or services to 
two different groups who both depend on the platform to intermediate 
between them” by making a simultaneous transaction302 almost certainly 
captures some types of platforms, for example rideshare apps and auction 
platforms, but leaves open questions about some of the more complex, 
vertically integrated tech companies like Amazon. 
In the Court’s determination that the plaintiff must allege harm to both 
sides of the market for credit card services, it appears that the Court’s 
principal consideration was the presence of strong indirect network 
effects.303  Although Justice Thomas does not say so expressly, his 
conclusion is based on research that explains that costs to one side are not 
reflective of market power or anticompetitive pricing, but of demand 
elasticity—i.e., indirect network effects.304  Thus, he argued, taking into 
consideration only the merchant in a rule of reason analysis would fail to 
account for American Express’s interdependent consumer side because the 
credit card market’s indirect network effects are so strong as to risk setting 
off a feedback loop of declining demand upon raising prices to one side.305 
Conversely, the Court differentiated the credit card market from the 
newspaper market through these indirect network effects and warned that 
courts should not consider both sides of a two-sided platform like the 
newspaper market “when the impacts of indirect network effects and relative 
pricing in that market are minor.”306  That is, because “newspaper readers 
are largely indifferent to the amount of advertising that a newspaper 
contains,” the network effects do not operate in this direction and the 
newspaper market is comparable to a one-sided market.307 
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After discussing the need for strong indirect network effects, the Court’s 
justification for defining one market shifted to its identification of American 
Express as a transaction platform, unlike a newspaper.308  This is because the 
platform facilitates a “single, simultaneous transaction” between merchants 
and credit card users.309  Further, as opposed to newspapers, a credit card 
platform like American Express may not sell its services to one side without 
selling to the other side, and its optimization of sales results from balancing 
each side in a way that newspapers need not consider.310 
Taking all of the AmEx Court’s factors into consideration, the plaintiffs 
can be understood to have needed to allege harm to both credit card 
merchants and consumer-users based on:  (1) strong bidirectional network 
effects between sides and the facilitation of (2) a single transaction between 
participants that is (3) simultaneous.311  Importantly, the Court did not 
specify whether all three considerations need apply to deem a firm a two-
sided transaction platform and, in the case of network effects, how strong 
they must be.  The answers to these questions will dramatically impact the 
analysis of complex tech platforms under AmEx.312 
B.  Where Does Amazon Fit? 
If Amazon is considered a two-sided transaction platform under the 
Court’s reasoning in AmEx, it will be difficult for the plaintiff-consumer or 
third-party seller to prove an antitrust violation.  Because Amazon Prime 
operates through transactions between Amazon and buyers, it is structured as 
a traditional firm and does not raise questions of sidedness.  However, 
Amazon Marketplace is less clear-cut.  In AmEx, the Court deemed American 
Express a two-sided transaction platform because of the existence of a 
simultaneous transaction.313  When a consumer buys a product from 
Amazon—as opposed to Amazon Marketplace—the seller has already sold 
their goods to Amazon;314 there is no simultaneous transaction between user 
and merchant and arguably no direct transaction at all.  That is, brands 
invoice Amazon for the products Amazon orders, irrespective of whether and 
for what price a user purchases them.315  Thus, even if the indirect network 
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effects between users and manufacturers are strong, Amazon is best viewed 
outside the scope of the AmEx requirement and any allegations of 
anticompetitive practices should be analyzed through the lens of either the 
market for the consumer-user or the market for the brand-seller. 
Whether Amazon Marketplace should be treated as a two-sided transaction 
platform raises a more complicated question.  On the surface, it would appear 
to be one, even paradigmatically so.316  Intuitively, its indirect network 
effects are strong.  Just as in the credit card market, consumers gain value 
from more merchants selling on the platform, and merchants gain value from 
more users shopping on the platform.317  Further, when a user buys a product 
from a third-party Amazon seller, the parties undergo a simultaneous 
transaction where the user directly pays the seller.318  This is the best 
argument in favor of defining a single market for Amazon:  it fits the Court’s 
quasi-test.  Still, there are additional legal and policy justifications worthy of 
consideration that make the analysis less clear-cut.  This section examines 
arguments for and against this potential classification of Amazon 
Marketplace. 
1.  Justifications for Applying AmEx to Amazon Marketplace 
Both legal and practical concerns support treating Amazon Marketplace as 
a two-sided transaction platform under AmEx.  First, justifying the Court’s 
holding, David S. Evans points out that when a platform that provides a 
service that is jointly and unseverably consumed by two different sides, as 
third-party sellers and users, these businesses never provide a transaction to 
only one side of the service.319  Thus, conduct that, when taking both sides 
into account, does not reduce the quality of the service or raise the total cost 
of the service should not reduce total market output or buyers’ surplus.320  
American Express, for example, did not reduce the amount of credit card 
transactions nor did it reduce the customer’s surplus.  In the case of Amazon 
Marketplace, much of Amazon’s behavior ends up benefiting users who 
engage in more transactions due to lower prices.321  So, in accepting this 
rationale for American Express and the credit card market, the same 
reasoning may apply to Amazon Marketplace. 
Also, practically speaking, Evans’s argument that actions against third-
party sellers have countervailing benefits to users is one that gets to the heart 
of antitrust law’s purpose—consumer welfare.322  Much of the reason for 
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Amazon’s continued growth is simply that its prioritization of scale and 
willingness to undergo debt is consumer-friendly.323  And courts have 
consistently identified the Sherman Act’s purpose not as maximizing 
competition but as serving consumers.324  Moreover, it is this focus on 
growth that has enabled Amazon’s innovation and, perhaps, it should be 
entitled to a procompetitive presumption, as courts and regulators tend not to 
intervene when consumers benefit.325  Such a presumption would fit with the 
idea of dynamic competition—that new industries will destroy old ones 
through innovation.326  Although not the primary concern of antitrust law, 
dynamic considerations have arisen in case law, for example in Verizon 
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,327 where the Court 
justified the act of charging monopoly prices in and of itself.328  In dicta, the 
Court expressed the sentiment that false negatives (false acquittals) for 
anticompetitive conduct are not troublesome because monopolies by nature 
are only temporary.329  Recent history lends support for this view:  platforms 
like MySpace, Nokia, and BlackBerry, once dominant in their respective 
spheres, have lost their status through innovation by competitors.330  Market 
dominance is not guaranteed to be permanent in an environment with fast 
technological change.331  Thus, critics of strong antitrust enforcement applied 
to tech companies warn that such a “precautionary approach,” which 
considers “the merest possibility of harm to be a sufficient basis to proscribe 
uncertain conduct,” would be costly “in an era of rapid technological 
innovation and evolving business models impelled by shifting consumer 
preferences and technological capabilities.”332 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to condemn restraints 
of trade involving new products or business practices for fear of chilling 
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innovation and reducing dynamic benefits.333  Along these lines, there is no 
doubt that Amazon has been innovative in its ability to dominate in multiple 
spheres, and perhaps fear of replacement or obsolescence may sustain its 
innovation.  By analogy, there is empirical support for the notion that when 
app developers fear Google’s entry into and potential takeover of their market 
(via Android), they reduce their innovation—but this innovation shifts to 
new, unaffected apps.334  Thus, platform owner entry may provide 
efficiencies by enabling more variety while eliminating redundant apps.335  
Perhaps third-party sellers on Amazon who fear Amazon’s entry into their 
market may react in a similar way. 
On the other hand, the fact that these platforms are building in the long-
term may render dynamic considerations less effective than would typically 
be expected.  For instance, evidence suggests that both actual entry and threat 
of entry by Amazon and Google alone deter innovation in complementary 
spaces.336  Further, a recent report of the University of Chicago’s Stigler 
Center suggests that “rapid self-correction in markets dominated by large 
digital platforms is unlikely, and that harms to economic welfare from the 
exercise of market power in such markets are substantial.”337  Additionally, 
“while monopoly profits are a lure to competitors [to enter], incumbents can 
use those very profits to entrench themselves and protect their position.”338  
Still, these limits to dynamic competition are far from certain. 
Lastly, from a judicial economy standpoint, it is more practical to have 
bright-line rules, free of carve-outs.  The Supreme Court agrees.339  A bright-
line rule, the Court has explained, beats the “unwarranted and 
counterproductive exercise [of] litigat[ing] a series of exceptions.”340  The 
Court has stated that “[t]he possibility of allowing an exception, even in 
rather meritorious circumstances, would undermine the rule.”341  However, 
Amazon is differently situated from American Express due to its 
distinguishable practices, and this may be a reason to exclude it from 
receiving the same protection under AmEx. 
2.  Reasons to Exclude Amazon from the AmEx Test 
While Amazon Marketplace may intuitively appear to fit into the AmEx 
Court’s constraints, the strength of Amazon’s indirect network effects may 
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not be so clear.  And arguably, some of Amazon’s practices in this space veer 
from the transaction platform’s principal function of intermediating between 
groups depending on the platform.342  Importantly, a broad definition of a 
two-sided transaction platform would not support the underlying premise of 
the fact-intensive rule of reason test that aims to understand and weigh 
commercial realities in a given industry.343 
Recent scholarship suggests that Amazon is more likely to enter into third-
party sellers’ markets as a competitor when the products have higher sales 
and better reviews.  Subsequently, this discourages third-party sellers from 
growing their businesses on the platform or continuing to offer the 
products.344  While prior research shows that platform owners generally tend 
to be dissuaded from competing with one or both sides of its market because 
of survival concerns, Amazon is differently situated because of its market 
power and its restraints that prevent third-party sellers from developing 
identities of their own on the platform to which buyers would develop 
loyalty.345  Further, Amazon has the resources and proven desire to price out 
its competition, and this results in considerable power over its consumer 
side.346  All of these concerns, along with its access to and use of sellers’ and 
buyers’ data,347 strongly suggest that Amazon Marketplace’s indirect 
network effects are weaker than other transaction platforms due to the 
platform’s interference.  That is, because Amazon as a vendor is able to 
leverage information asymmetry to compete with its sellers, consumers may 
not value additional third-party sellers—and instead prefer Amazon as a 
vender.  And sellers may not value additional consumers, as they will fear 
Amazon intruding into their product spaces. 
This inference complements research that frames the most important 
difference between merchants and two-sided platforms as control by the 
seller.348  That is, in a two-sided transaction platform, the third-party seller 
has full control over selling its product, and this results in a direct interaction 
between the two sides.349  Thus, without the platform’s interference in buyer-
seller interactions, the network effects are more pronounced. 
For these reasons, Amazon’s interference into third-party sellers’ products 
necessarily weakens network effects between the seller and buyer:  if more 
buyers enter the market, based on a combination of Amazon’s price and 
nonprice restraints to both sides, sellers may only temporarily increase their 
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value, if at all.350  Thus, as the Court’s decision in AmEx defined a two-sided 
transaction platform at least partially by the strength of its network effects, 
Amazon would not qualify as a two-sided transaction platform if its indirect 
network effects are weak. 
Additionally, while some may consider this inference about the strength 
of network effects speculative without empirical measure, the fact that 
Amazon has a material interest in its sellers’ transactions and uses this 
derivative data suggests that it does not merely “intermediate between” 
parties at all and should be exempt on this ground.351  That is, while Amazon 
in operating its marketplace must indeed “bring both sides on board,” by 
competing with its sellers through its vendor platform, it functions unlike the 
two-sided transaction platforms that the Court defined in AmEx.  “For credit 
cards, the network can sell its services only if a merchant and cardholder both 
simultaneously choose to use the network.”352  Here, while this may be true 
for any given transaction between user and third-party seller, Amazon may 
also bypass sellers to facilitate its own transactions with consumers either 
through wholesaler deals or the development and promotion of its own 
product lines.353  Amazon blurs this distinction between its marketplace and 
its direct-to-consumer sales platform, for instance, by presenting itself as the 
default seller even when marketplace vendors offer lower prices on the 
particular product.354  In doing so, a marketplace transaction is no longer 
between seller and buyer but between Amazon and buyer, and this renders it 
far outside the scope of “facilitat[ing] a single, simultaneous transaction 
between participants.”355  Thus, to treat it as a two-sided transaction platform 
under AmEx by defining only one relevant market would ignore this crucial 
distinction that it does more than facilitate transactions by engaging in them 
as well. 
3.  Middle Ground:  Calculating Indirect Network Effects in Court356 
In their 2013 paper Identifying Two-Sided Markets, Lapo Filistrucchi, 
Damien Geradin, and Eric van Damme wrestle with this issue of when to 
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focus on one or both sides of the market for purposes of market definition of 
two-sided platforms.357  Their answer is to first measure the indirect network 
effects that link the demands of the two sides and then examine whether they 
apply to one side or both, whether they are both positive, and how significant 
they are.358  In a transaction platform, the greater the indirect network effects, 
the more two-sided the market is.359  The authors discuss both qualitative 
methods—i.e., using intuition or interview—and quantitative methods of 
calculating network effects.360  In the interview approach, one may assess the 
two-sided nature of a market by asking actors “whether they value positively 
or negatively the presence of more customers on the other side.”361  As 
applied to Amazon, this would involve asking third-party sellers if they value 
more buyers on the platform and asking buyers if they value more sellers.  
Intuitively, sellers will desire more buyers but perhaps only to a certain extent 
when considering the possibility of Amazon’s entry into the market.  The 
quantitative approach would be the same but would rely on data of the actual 
behavior of market participants.362 
This approach appears to be a reasonable middle ground, but it is not 
without limitations.  First, such an inquiry, especially a quantitative 
approach, would require a lot of time, slowing potential investigation or 
litigation.363  Second, evidence suggests that a highly technical inquiry may 
be ill-suited for “generalist judges.”364  Lastly, this solution may create a line-
drawing problem because “two-sidedness is not a 0-1 notion:  rather, there is 
a continuum of forms of intermediation.”365  That is, how two-sided must the 
platform be to receive AmEx treatment? 
 
square with the Supreme Court’s majority opinion, it is beyond the scope of this Note. See id. 
at 747 (affirming that “[t]he Supreme Court has endorsed a market definition that considers 
instances where Peter gets robbed . . . but Paul gets paid”). 
 357. Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Identifying Two-Sided Markets, 36 WORLD COMPETITION 33, 
44–58 (2013). 
 358. Id. at 44. 
 359. Id. at 45; cf. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018) (“[T]wo-sided transaction platforms 
exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects . . . .”). 
 360. Filistrucchi et al., supra note 357, at 45. 
 361. Id. at 49. 
 362. Id. at 50. 
 363. Id. at 59. 
 364. See Tim Wu, Contemporary Critique, The American Express Opinion, the Rule of 
Reason, and Tech Platforms, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 117, 119 (2019) (suggesting that 
“[b]y mixing in unnecessarily complex economic principles . . . generalist courts . . . might 
cherry-pick a new economic theory for each case so as to yield the result preferred” which 
could distance antitrust law from “the competitive realities of the industry in question”).  See 
generally Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist 
Judges?:  The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (2011) (showing that decisions involving the evaluation of complex economic 
evidence are significantly more likely to be appealed, though decisions of judges trained in 
basic economics are significantly less likely to be appealed). 
 365. Hagiu, supra note 348, at 118. 
2019] AMAZON AND PLATFORM ANTITRUST 227 
Nevertheless, as a subsequent case has pointed out, “[n]othing in American 
Express supports the notion that a relevant market can be defined to include 
more than one side without performing any economic analysis.”366 
IV.  PROPOSAL:  EXCLUDE AMAZON FROM AMEX 
Even if network effects are not discernably different between Amazon and 
American Express, there are still reasons to exclude Amazon from AmEx 
treatment.  That is, Amazon as an antitrust defendant should not be 
considered a two-sided transaction platform, and thus any relevant market 
under a rule of reason analysis should only encompass one side.  If an ousted 
seller were to sue Amazon,367 the seller at the first step of the rule of reason 
test need only prove that Amazon harmed sellers, not buyers. 
This reasoning is informed by economics literature on the impact of 
platform owners’ entry into complementors’ spaces and could also apply to 
transaction platform app stores and web search results.  Specifically, research 
shows that Android app developers reduce innovation and raise prices for 
affected apps as Google’s entry threat—i.e., the likelihood that Google will 
develop a competing app for their own operating system—increases.368  Then 
once Google enters, the developers reduce innovation and increase prices 
further.369  Similarly, when Google exercises its control by prioritizing its 
own inferior search results over those of its competitors, it results in harms 
to consumer welfare.370  Google’s steering of users to its own search content, 
like Amazon does as well,371 results in both worse content for users and 
declining site views for its competitors (who are also its complementors).372 
Similarly, recent scholarship distinguishes firms that function as 
marketplaces from resellers and points out that Amazon is more likely to 
operate in “reseller mode” by squeezing out the third-party seller and acting 
as a vendor itself when it has privileged information about the preferences of 
buyers.373  For example, because consumer preferences and product varieties 
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in the area of consumer electronics are unstable and hard to predict, Amazon 
is less likely to sell them as a reseller (via Amazon Prime) and more likely to 
allow third-party sellers to sell them on Amazon Marketplace.374  The 
informational advantages provided by Amazon’s data collection situate it 
differently from American Express.  Knowing in real time through 
marketplace data which products are sold to whom, at what price, which 
packaging and incentives work for consumers, among other learnings from 
operating in multiple verticals, creates the incentive and ability to act in 
accordance with that information.375  Insulation from scrutiny by way of 
AmEx protection would amplify this advantage. 
This proposal also helps maintain the burden-shifting framework of the 
rule of reason test, which reflects that the plaintiff’s burden at the first step is 
merely to show harm to competition in any relevant market.376  To require a 
plaintiff-seller to prove anticompetitive harm to both sellers and buyers to 
make a prima facie case against Amazon would simply be too heavy of a 
burden.377  Where courts already “dispose of 97 percent of cases at the first 
[step], on the grounds that there is no anticompetitive effect,”378 relying on a 
field so new and unsettled379 to require a plaintiff to prove harm to two 
distinct groups at the first step is problematic without a deeper understanding 
of the indirect network effects that the AmEx Court held must be more than 
minor or weak.380  To do so going forward would lead to unpredictable 
results, if not consumer harm, from a pleading standard too difficult for a 
plaintiff to meet. 
Further, as AmEx contained “no serious discussion of the rationale for 
placing more, less, or the same weight on each type of participant for 
achieving the objectives of antitrust policy,”381 there is certainly an 
opportunity to give, for example, third-party sellers on Amazon Marketplace 
greater weight over the benefiting consumer.  As even AmEx’s defenders 
argue, the case only establishes that two-sided features are relevant for 
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assessing whether restraints are anticompetitive, which leaves open the 
question of how we should analyze these features.382 
In limiting the thrust of the AmEx decision, courts can take steps to better 
protect plaintiffs, as antitrust defendants are better equipped than plaintiffs to 
present an effective case with experts.383  Antitrust jurisprudence is 
frequently cited for the goal of choosing a market definition that “can be 
determined only after a factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced 
by consumers.”384  Where the commercial realities faced by seller-consumers 
vary so drastically from buyer-consumers due to the platform’s control, 
separate markets should be defined. 
Lastly, policy rationales support this minor imposition on tech’s biggest 
companies.  Size alone, when combined with data accumulation, potential 
mergers, and more, gives these companies a disproportionate amount of 
power over consumers, small business owners, their own employees, and 
governments.385  Amazon continues to grow in size and scope of business,386 
enter into public-private partnerships,387 exert lobbying power,388 amass, 
use, and sell unprecedented amounts of detailed consumer data.389  Further, 
as Amazon uses protected profits to enter into new markets, potential 
conflicts of interest and competition with complementors occurs more and 
more frequently.390  While antitrust investigations and litigation, especially 
under the consumer welfare standard, will not fully resolve these issues, 
preventing an AmEx loophole of sorts would preserve some degree of 
accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
While AmEx was billed in the headlines as a decision that could leave tech 
companies with unlimited power, its holding was likely narrow enough to 
avoid any impact of the sort, and some commentators have already suggested 
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that it may end up being inconsequential.391  But, as it is already difficult 
enough to successfully allege an antitrust injury, especially in a rule of reason 
case, it would be a mistake to create a loophole based on relatively new 
economic concepts that are arguably broader in scope than much of the 
literature would recommend.392  In the particular application to Amazon 
Marketplace, it would further an already present informational 
asymmetry.393  Presuming that two-sided concepts will remain in antitrust 
law, their unsettled dimensions and great variation present a compelling 
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